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In Dial v. Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission, 10 I.L.R. 3012
(D. Ariz., Jan. 12, 1983), the district court reviewed the denial of
relocation benefits by the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission
even after a hearing officer recommended to the Commission that
plaintiff was eligible for relocation benefits.
To be eligible for relocation benefits, plaintiff had to be a resi-
dent of the Joint Use Area who had moved away between
December 22, 1974 and August 30, 1978.' Residency was defined
in the Commission's regulations as either "current occupancy"
or "maintenance of substantial recurring contacts within an iden-
tifiable homesite although the individual is temporarily away for
any of the following reasons," including "education or job train-
ing."' 2 The facts showed that plaintiff was a resident of the Joint
Use Area living off the reservation in pursuit of an education and
had moved from the Joint Use Area during the appropriate
period of time.
The reasons stated by the Relocation Commission for reversal
of the recommendation were that plaintiff had not relocated
because of passage of the Administrative Procedure Act.' Addi-
tionally, plaintiff was not a member of a family prevented from
living in the Former Joint Use Area who could have benefited
from the regulations. Plaintiff also had not met the requirement
of "substantial and recurring contacts within the intent of Com-
mission's regulations."
The district court decided that the affidavits stating the reasons
for denial of relief benefits were an inadequate explanation of the
Commission's decisions. The affidavits failed to explain why the
findings of fact were inadequate to show "substantial recurring
contacts." The district court held that plaintiff was a resident
who was eligible for relocation benefits under regulations of the
Commission. The district court also found the Commission's
decision that Dial was not a resident of the Joint Use Area from
1972 to 1976 was "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discre-
tion."
1. 25 C.F.R. § 700.147.
2. 27 C.F.R. § 700.97.
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
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JURISDICTION
In the consolidated cases of Ahboah v. Housing Authority of the
Kiowa Tribe and Saumty v. Housing Authority of the Kiowa
Tribe, 660 P.2d 625 (Okla. 1983), the Housing Authority brought
an action in forcible entry and detainer against allottees of the
Kiowa and Wichita tribes who occupied housing on Indian coun-
try allotment land. Allottees' motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, to quash summonses, and to join the United States
as a necessary party were denied, and judgment was entered for
the Housing Authority by the District Court of Caddo County.
Allottees appealed.
Allottees argued that because individual trust allotments con-
stituted Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), they were
subject to federal and tribal jurisdiction rather than state jurisdic-
tion. They also argued that the state of Oklahoma had not met
the requirements of Public Law 280' as a prerequisite to assuming
jurisdiction. In addition, they claimed that state process served in
Indian country had not brought allottees within authority of state
courts.
The Housing Authority argued that the trust allotments were
not in Indian country and subject to federal or tribal jurisdiction
because the cession of tribal lands by the Treaty of October 21,
18822 extinguished tribal title to land subsequently allotted. The
Kiowa Tribe, as amicus curiae, asserted tribal jurisdiction over
the actions and argued that state jurisdiction would infringe the
tribal right of self-government.
On appeal, the district court's order was found void and was
reversed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma based its decision on United States v. Nice,3 where the
Supreme Court decided that only Congress had the power to ter-
minate tribal relations and divest the federal government of
jurisdiction over trust allotments. The enactment of the General
Allotment Act of 1887" contained provisions that continued
federal supervision over allotted lands. Therefore, no congres-
sional intent to terminate tribal relations was demonstrated. Trust
allotments remained under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.
It was not necessary for trust allotments to be within a continuing
1. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588.
2. Ratified June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 676.
3. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).




reservation in order to retain their Indian character. Moreover,
that the allotment had been leased did not change the Indian
character of the land.
Public Law 280 gave express congressional consent to state
assumption of jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country if cer-
tain conditions were met.I Under the original law, states were
divided into mandatory states, which were required to assume
civil and criminal jurisdiction, and optional states, which volun-
tarily assumed jurisdiction by "affirmative legislative action."
The Ahboah court found that Oklahoma, an optional state, did
not take the legislative action to assume jurisdiction before Public
Law 280 was amended in 1968 by the Indian Civil Rights Act.
6
The amendment removed the affirmative legislative action re-
quirement but substituted a requirement for consent by a tribal
referendum before state jurisdiction could be assumed. The
Kiowa Tribe had never given such consent. The court therefore
concluded that Public Law 280 had not authorized state assump-
tion of jurisdiction over disputes involving Indian trust property.
LEGISLATION
The Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982' provides
that Indian tribal governments will be treated as states under cer-
tain circumstances. These circumstances include the determina-
tion of whether a contribution to or for the use of a tribal
government is deductible under section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which relates to income tax deduction for gifts,
and to charity under sections 2055 and 2106(a)(2), concerning
estate tax deductions for transfers of public, charitable, and
religious uses, and section 2522, concerning gift tax deductions.
Tribal governments will also be treated as states for purposes
of excise taxes imposed by chapter 31 (taxes on special fuels),
chapter 32 (manufacturers' excise tax), subchapter B of chapter
33 (communications taxes), and subchapter D of chapter 36
(motor vehicle use taxes). Other purposes for the treatment of a
tribal government as a state include the taxation of colleges and
5. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, amended by Pub. L. 90-284, Act of
Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 80.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
1. Pub. L. 97-473 (Jan. 14, 1983), 96 Stat. 2605.
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universities that are agencies or instrumentalities of governments
or subdivisions, public retirement systems, scholarship and
fellowship grants, taxation of excess expenditures to influence
legislation, and taxation of private foundations. In order to be
eligible for excise tax exemptions, the transaction must involve a
government function that is essential to the Indian tribal govern-
ment.
The Act also lists requirements for tax-exempt bonds issued by
Indian tribal governments. It provides that there are no exemp-
tions for certain private-activity bonds, such as industrial
development bonds, scholarship bonds, and mortgage subsidy
bonds.
The Act also provides that a subdivision of an Indian tribal
government shall be treated the same as a subdivision of a state
only if the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State
determine that the governmental functions of the Indian tribal
government have been delegated to the subdivision.
The amendments apply to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1982, and to obligations and estates of decedents
dying after December 31, 1982 and before January 1, 1985. As to
taxes imposed by subchapter D, the amendments apply after
January 1, 1983 and before December 31, 1984.
RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENTS
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Watt, 10 LL.R. 2096
(9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court deci-
sion that had allowed Southern Pacific to have right-of-way
across the Walker River Paiute Reservation without tribal con-
sent. The Southern Pacific Railroad had operated on the Walker
River Indian Reservation since 1882 without a valid right-of-way.
After the Ninth Circuit held that Southern Pacific had no valid
right-of-way across the reservation, ' Southern Pacific applied for
a railroad, telegraph, and telephone right-of-way with the
Western Nevada Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs under
the provisions of an 1899 Act of Congress.2 The application was
denied because there was no evidence that the tribe had consented
to the right-of-way. Southern Pacific appealed the decision within
the agency and later sought review in federal district court where
1. United States v. Southern Pac. Transp., 543 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1976).




the tribe intervened as a party defendant. Summary judgment
was entered in favor of Southern Pacific by the district court.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the 1899 Act was not an
eminent domain statute and authorized the Secretary to establish
grant preconditions by regulations. Tribal consent was one of
these grant preconditions. The court's review was therefore
limited to determining the reasonableness of the Secretary's inter-
pretation of the 1899 Act. The Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary's interpretation of the 1899 Act was reasonable and met
the obligation to construe the Act favorably to the tribe. The ap-
peals court also decided that it was not necessary to determine
whether the 1899 Act was a grant in praesenti (grant at the pre-
sent time, subject only to expressly specified conditions precedent
and subsequent) because in praesenti grants did not limit the right
of the United States to put conditions on the grant.
SOVEREIGNTY
In Bruette v. Knope, 554 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1983),
members of the Menominee Indian Tribe brought a civil rights
action against seventeen county and tribal officials in their of-
ficial and individual capacities for injuries arising from a car
chase, collision and arrest. Plaintiffs sought damages and injunc-
tive relief against future unlawful conduct'that threatened plain-
tiff's civil rights. The defendants made motions to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action. The defendants included the
Menominee tribal police chief and policemen, the chairman of
the Menominee Indian Tribal Law and Order Committee, tribal
prosecutors, the Shawano County Sheriff's Department,
Shawano County, the sheriff of Shawano County, the chief depu-
ty sheriff of Shawano County, Shawano County deputy sheriffs,
Menominee County, the Menominee County Sheriff's Depart-
ment, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff in their individual
capacities.
The district court held that tribal officials are immune from
suit under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.1 The complaint
against them was dismissed. The Indian Civil Rights Act2 allowed
3. 25 C.F.R. § 161.3(a) (1981).
1. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
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only tribes and governmental subdivisions to be sued, not in-
dividuals. Dismissal as to nontribal defendants was denied. The
claim against the deputy sheriffs of Shawano County was not dis-
missed because they had a duty not to fail to stop other officers
from punishing someone in their presence. If defendant owed
plaintiff a duty to act, a purposeful nonfeasance could serve as a
basis for intentional tort. Failure to provide adequate training
was an insufficient claim. Plaintiff's allegation that a "history of
police brutality" existed was a sufficient complaint because a
specific incident that deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest was alleged, along with the allegation of a specific
similar incident.
In Wisconsin v. Baker, 10 I.L.R. 2077 (10th Cir. 1983), the state
of Wisconsin and the Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior and the
Mississippi River both claimed exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
fishing and hunting by the general public in certain lakes in
Wisconsin. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive
relief to Wisconsin and declared that the state had exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing of nonband members
on navigable waters on the reservation. Defendants, the officials
of the tribe, appealed from the final judgment and Wisconsin
cross-appealed on four findings in the opinion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had proper
original subject matter jurisdiction because the claim that defen-
dants had infringed property rights held in trust for the public
arose under federal law. The appellate court concurred with the
district court's holding that defendants had immunity from suit
only if a treaty made in 1854 conferred the power to restrict
public fishing in lakes. The treaty had not conferred this power.
Wisconsin had been given power to regulate fishing in navigable
lakes with statehood. The Treaty of 1854 did not clearly divest
Wisconsin of part of its sovereignty over non-Indians. Therefore,
the court concluded the state alone had the authority to regulate
fishing by nonband members on navigable waters on the reserva-
tion.
With respect to the state's cross-appeal, the court held it was
not necessary to decide whether the boundaries of the reservation
encompassed navigable lakes because defendants lacked jurisdic-
tion to restrict fishing in them.
In Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 700 F.2d 1285 (10th




judgment that Navajo tribal funds had been improperly held by
the bank in satisfaction of a debt of the Navajo Housing and
Development Enterprise (NHDE). The Navajo Tribe had created
NHDE in early 1972. In March 1974 and December 1975, NHDE
acquired loans from the Bank of New Mexico. NHDE defaulted
on the loans, which amounted to $283,518.96 in November of
1976. The bank deducted that amount from a six-month certifi-
cate of deposit with a maturity date of November 22, 1976 be-
longing to the Navajo Tribe.
The issue on appeal was whether the NHDE was essentially the
same legal entity as the Navajo Tribe since the tribe had
established NHDE in conformity with tribal law. The bank
argued that the tribe did not have the capacity to create a
semigovernmental entity. Alternatively, the bank argued the
operation of NHDE by the tribe estopped the tribe from claiming
that NHDE and the tribe were separate entities. The second issue
was whether the bank had the legal right to offset the NHDE
debt against the Navajo tribal funds. The third issue was whether
the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court's conclu-
sion on the issue of separateness of the tribal enterprise and
found that the tribe had the power to create a semigovernmental
entity that was separate from the tribe. The appellate court also
decided the bank had no right to set off the debt of NHDE
against the tribe because there was no debtor-creditor relation-
ship. The debts of NHDE were independent of the debts of the
tribe. Prejudgment interest was awarded at a rate of 6% per
annum.
TREATIES
In Swim v. Bergland, 10 I.L.R. 2034 (9th Cir. 1983), the rights of
non-Indian permittees and the Shoshone-Bannock tribes to graze
cattle on federal land in the Caribou National Forest in Idaho
were at issue. Non-Indians who had been issued grazing permits
in 1976 and 1977 initiated a declaratory judgment action against
the Secretary of Agriculture on April 5, 1978. The non-Indian
permittees sought to enjoin implementation of a memorandum of
understanding executed by the tribes on February 27, 1978. The
memorandum provided the maximum head of cattle that could be
grazed annually by the tribes within the ceded area of the
Caribou National Forest and that annual permits could be issued
by the Forest Service to non-Indians for any grazing capacity not
used by the tribe. The district court upheld the memorandum of
1982]
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understanding and held that the Forest Service could modify or
cancel grazing permits of non-Indians because only they had
revocable grazing privileges.
The non-Indian permittees appealed the district court's ruling
that permitted grazing to be continued by the tribes. They argued
that the Agreement of February 5, 1898, article IV, 31 Stat. 674,
reserved temporary tribal grazing rights that had been extinguished
by executive action. The tribes and the Secretary of Agriculture
cross-appealed the district court's holding that the tribe's reserved
rights included a "fair proportion" of grazing capacity on the
ceded land. They claimed the Fort Bridger Treaty of July 3, 1868
between the United States and the Eastern Band of Shoshone and
Bannock tribes, ratified February 24, 1869, 15 Stat. 209, and the
Agreement of February 5, 1898 between the United States and the
Shoshone-Bannock tribes, ratified by the Act of June 6, 1900, 31
Stat. 672, reserved priority to the land for the tribes.
The Ninth Circuit held that the tribes had continuing grazing
rights on the ceded portion of the Caribou National Forest. The
court also held that the Shoshone-Bannock tribes had priority
grazing rights that were reserved by the Fort Bridger Treaty of
1868 and the Agreement of 1898. Because there was no language
in the 1898 Agreement that granted or reserved rights in the graz-
ing lands to the non-Indians, the Indian treaty was not read to
grant the rights to non-Indians.
WATER RIGHTS
In Cherokee Nation v. Muskogee City-County Port Authority, 10
LL.R. 3021 (E.D. Okla. 1983), the Cherokee Nation sought par-
tial summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to affirm their title to the bed of the Arkansas
River that flowed through Muskogee, Oklahoma. The Cherokee
Nation also sought to establish liability of the Muskogee City-
County Port Authority for trespass caused by construction of
wharves and piers by defendants without consent of the Cherokee
Nation. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the bed and banks of the
Arkansas River on the basis of Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,'
which confirmed the Cherokee Nation's title.
The district court affirmed the Cherokee Nation's title for the
Arkansas riverbed under the doctrines of stare decisis and res
judicata. Because the state did not own the riverbed of the
1. 397 U.S. 620 (1969), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 945 (1970).
[Vol. 10
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Arkansas River where it flowed through Muskogee, it had no
authority to grant riparian rights to the Muskogee City-County
Port Authority. The court granted plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment and denied defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment. The court stayed the action pending appeal.
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